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SECURITY INFORMATION

18 December 1951

CAREER SERVICE COMMITTEE

Subject: Summary of Proceedings of Working Groups

1. The following summaries of the activities and tentative conclusions of the six Working Groups are distributed for the information and convenience of all members of the Working Groups, so that fullest coordination and interchange of ideas and planning may be effected. The Career Service Committee has authorized their distribution for the purposes indicated above, but without having been formally approved or disapproved by the Committee.
2. The Career Service Committee at its meeting on 17 December 1951 recommended that the members of the Working Groups study and consider the following Summary of Proceedings of the Working Groups in light of the following principles which represent a modification in the policies that have previously been considered.

a. The "Career Service Program" is actually composed of two basic programs or endeavors. While these two programs should be developed together if possible, it is inevitable that they will be developed at different rates. They are:

- 1) A program to conduct normal personnel, training and management affairs a little better than we have yet been able to. Inherent in this program are those matters which are basic to any well-managed Personnel Program. Among those matters are:
 - a) Recruitment and Placement
 - b) Employee Ratings
 - c) Employee Relations and Counseling
 - d) Normal Indoctrination and Training
 - e) Equitable application of improved benefits and prerogatives, etc.

This program should be equally applied to all (repeat all) staff employees and staff agents of CIA without any distinction as to grade, assignment, length of service, etc.

- 2) A program to discover and exploit to the fullest, the talents and potentialities of proven employees, e.g. a "Development Program" for the purpose of ensuring to the Agency the best possible use of its available manpower. Useful techniques in this program are:

- a) Rotation
- b) Re-training (i.e. seminar and refresher courses)
- c) Duty assignments with on-the-job training
- d) Extension training, including sabbatical leave, overseas travel, etc.

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This "Development Program" will locate and produce the future key executives and administrators of the Agency. In addition to the techniques listed above, the following might apply:

- e) The generalist-specialist concept.
 - f) Assignment to National War College, duty with JCS Joint Staff, duty with Dept. of State Policy Planning Staff, etc.
- b. These two programs add up to what we are calling a "Career Service Program".

For the CAREER SERVICE COMMITTEE

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/s/

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Executive Secretary

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~~SECRET~~ SELECTION CRITERIA I-1

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I Working Group on SELECTION CRITERIA

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(8 meetings have been held and the following summary is complete through 14 December 1951)

1. Work Plan

The task assigned by the Career Service Committee was broken into four main problems and so approved by the Career Service Committee. It was agreed, insofar as feasible, to solve each of these problems individually and in this order:

- A. To recommend the selection criteria by which employees become eligible to participate in a Career Service Program.
 - B. To recommend the degree to which selection governing participation in the Program should be centralized.
 - C. To recommend the mechanics of selection.
 - D. To recommend how the Career Service Program should be activated with respect to employee participation.
2. A tentative solution to problem "A" above is embodied in Attachment 1 hereto.
3. A tentative solution to problem "B" is embodied in Attachment 2 hereto.
4. The Working Group felt that the report "A Program for the Establishment of a Career Corps in the Central Intelligence Agency" dated 7 August 1951 offered a logical point of departure in attacking its assigned task. Therefore, those portions of that reference cited in paragraph 1 of Career Service Committee's directive (dated 15 October 1951) to our Working Group were discussed in detail. These discussions have resulted in the following conclusions: (Paragraphs and sections cited are those in the "Program...." dated 7 August 1951.)

A. Introduction, page x

The Working Group adopted the following statement: "The Working Group has reviewed the comments of the Assistant Directors which were overwhelmingly opposed to the concept of an "elite corps" and concurs in the abandonment of that concept. The Working

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Group further agrees that only those employees who have demonstrated their ability throughout a period of two years' service in the Agency will be considered immediately eligible to participate in the Career Service Program. During the first two years of an employee's service with CIA, training, appraisal, and supervision will be directed towards preparing him to participate in the Career Service Program."

B. Paragraph V, pages xii, xiii

The Working Group adopted the following statement: "The concepts contained in this paragraph (i.e. age in relation to grade and testing and assessment as criteria for selection) are rejected by the Working Group and not recommended for adoption as criteria."

C. Appendix J, pages 52-55

The Working Group adopted the following statement: "Testing and assessment should not be considered as mandatory in connection with the determination of the eligibility of an employee to participate in the Career Service Program. Testing and assessment are valid and useful techniques to be used in recruiting new employees and are available for evaluating any employee at any time at the discretion of the appropriate Assistant Director."

5. It is emphasized that conclusions and other decisions here recorded are tentative. We have found that discussion in one area may result in changing prior conclusions that had resulted from exploration of a different area.

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Attachments

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SELECTION CRITERIA I-3

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Attachment 1

Working Group on SELECTION CRITERIA 12 December 1951

SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PARTICIPATION IN CIA CAREER SERVICE PROGRAM

1. INTRODUCTION

A basis for planning was agreed upon as suitable, feasible and desirable.

The bulk of CIA employees, both graded and ungraded, who have completed two years' satisfactory service, should immediately become eligible for participation in the Career Service Program.

2. RECOMMENDATION

A. CIA civilian employees satisfying the following requirements shall be eligible to participate in the Career Service Program:

- (1) Staff employee or staff agent status.
- (2) Not less than two years' continuous, satisfactory service.
- (3) High school graduate or equivalent as determined by his Office Board.
- (4) Security clearance certified by I&S Office.
- (5) Written agreement to make a career of employment with CIA, including willingness to serve in any domestic or overseas CIA post for which by Agency determination qualified job-wise and physically.

B. Eligibility to participate in the Career Service Program shall be determined only on the basis of the above-named requirements. It is to be noted particularly that:

- (1) No age limitations are set.
- (2) Civil Service Commission certification is not required.
- (3) No physical standards beyond those regularly used for Agency employment are required for participation in the Career Service

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SELECTION CRITERIA I-4

Program and special physical examinations for this Program as distinct from normal employment are not contemplated.

3. DISCUSSION

A. Re Introduction

The planning basis laid down in INTRODUCTION stems from two major aims:

- (1) To banish from employees' minds the fear that the Career Service Program is a scheme for creating and nurturing an elite corps of a favored few.
- (2) To make the incentives and benefits of the Career Service Program available to the bulk of Agency employees who demonstrate potential and interest in long-term CIA employment.

The fundamental two-year limit for participation was selected because it sets a reasonable period (two years) at the end of which an employee knows whether or not he can plan on the benefits of a CIA career. A longer period was considered, but rejected because of the competing incentives of a wide variety of non-CIA jobs in Washington.

B. Re "Staff employee or staff agent status"

This stops the obviously inappropriate inclusion in the Career Service Program of contract, consultant, and special agent categories. It embraces those who work full time with no predictable short-term connection.

C. Re "Not less than two years" continuous, satisfactory service"

This tightens the basic two-year concept through the requirement of continuous service. It was agreed that this additional requirement was in Agency interest and would not impact unfavorably on persons genuinely interested in career development.

D. Re "High school graduate as minimum or passing an equivalent examination"

Comments on the originally proposed "Career Corps" have indicated fears that too great emphasis was placed on academic background as opposed to on-the-job success. Further, this working group's

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recommendations broaden the potential career corps group to include many lower GS ratings who will often not be college graduates but who nevertheless have the potential for a CIA career. Consequently, a college degree requirement was rejected. It was agreed, however, that with today's opportunities for a high school education or for acquiring its equivalent through experience, Agency interest demands this minimal standard.

E. Re "Security clearance certified by I&S"

This leaves control of security requirements with I&S.

F. Re "Written agreement to make a career of employment with CIA"

A successful career service program should build within the Agency an ever increasing body of employees with training, broad experience and education superior to those of most other government Agencies and Departments. There can be expected, therefore, a tendency to proselyte CIA careerists on the one hand and on the other a growing temptation for CIA careerists to accept a here-and-now promotion with another Agency to grades which CIA vacancies would not then permit. Therefore, this requirement is set: not as a legal preventive but as the only feasible measure, a moral binder.

G. Re "Written agreement to serve in domestic or overseas CIA posts for which by Agency determination qualified jobwise and physically."

Again this is no legal binder since in the final analysis any employee may reject an Agency decision on domestic or overseas employment and resign. But it does seem reasonable to ask that an employee who wants a CIA career be willing, if qualified jobwise and physically, to serve away from Washington, D. C. for some periods. CIA can operate only by staffing a complex of world-wide areas. It must, therefore, make its career service incentives - such as advancement, tenure and retirement - strong enough to attract and hold many persons who want jobs that are not run-of-the-mine government chores in a tidy and secure niche cemented to a single geographical point. Other things equal, a persons so willing to serve is worth more to CIA and merits more from CIA. The "jobwise and physical" qualifications should operate to

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protect individuals from moves to assignments for which they are not suited, and the Agency from wasteful moving of its personnel.

4. COMMENT

It is emphasized that while the concept presented in this attachment insures that the bulk of CIA employees can participate in the Career Service Program, this participation is not a guarantee of immediate promotions or of ultimate grade levels for the various participants. Rather it means:

- (1) Codification of rights and benefits so that the employee knows where he stands and what he may reasonably plan for. These should include preferential advancement, tenure and retirement.
- (2) Increased opportunity for training - within and outside CIA.
- (3) Increased opportunity for rotation.
- (4) Increased opportunity for education - within and outside CIA.
- (5) Increased assurance that he will go as far as his ability justifies.

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SELECTION CRITERIA I-7

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Attachment 2

Working Group on SELECTION CRITERIA

12 December 1951

CENTRALIZATION OF SELECTION FOR PARTICIPATION
IN THE CIA CAREER SERVICE PROGRAM

1. INTRODUCTION

The Working Group agreed to consider the subject of centralization of selection of candidates for participation in the Career Service Program in over-all, general terms as distinguished from the procedures of the selection process which will involve detailed consideration of such specific items as promotion policy, selection out, and so forth.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Policy respecting both the selection process and the operation of the Program should be centralized in a CIA Career Service Board, acting on behalf of CIA as a whole, while the mechanics of the selection process should be decentralized to Office Career Service Boards. The procedures and details of operation of the Program should be a primary responsibility of Assistant Directors and Office Heads. In order to provide further decentralization, if the size of a particular Office or comparable unit makes it necessary for efficient and equable processing, Assistant Directors or Office Heads should create additional, equally empowered boards as necessary.

B. CIA Career Service Board

1. Membership:
 - a. Deputy Director, CIA or alternate
 - b. Deputy Director, Plans or alternate
 - c. Deputy Director, Administration or alternate
 - d. Director of Training
 - e. Assistant Director, Personnel

Secretariat (Career Development Staff:
Personnel Office)

2. Functions:
 - a. Develops policy governing the Career Service Program for submission to the Director of Central Intelligence and serves as his advisor on all matters concerning the Program.

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- b. Advises, and reviews the functioning of, /Office/ Career Service Boards.
- c. Reviews the functioning of the Career Service Program including:
 - 1) Approving, on a continuing basis, selection standards employed in the training and rotation programs.
 - 2) Acting as final board of appeal and adjudication in all Career Service matters involving /Office/ Career Service Boards, Agency Offices or comparable units and individuals.

C. /Office/ Career Service Board

- 1. Membership:
 - a. Assistant Director or Deputy Assistant Director (or Office Head)
 - b. Staff or Division Chiefs (as appointed by Assistant Director or Office Head)

Secretariat (as appointed by Assistant Director or Office Head)

The proceedings and actions of each Office Board, including the list of its members, will be available on a regular basis to the CIA Career Service Board. It is recommended that consideration be given to augmenting the Office T/O's, if necessary, in order to provide the necessary Secretariat.

- 2. Functions:
 - a. Serves as advisor to the Assistant Director or Office Head and acts for him on all matters pertaining to the Career Service Program.
 - b. Approves or disapproves selection for initial participation in the Career Service Program.
 - c. Directs within the office, the application and functioning of the Career Service Program.

3. DISCUSSION

It was generally acknowledged that the current proposal for establishment of a Career Development Staff in the Personnel Office was sound and essential. With regard to the /Office/ Career Service Boards, it was the opinion of the Selection Criteria Working Group that only Assistant Directors or Office Heads, their Deputies, and Staff and Division Chiefs

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EMPLOYEE RATING II-1

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II Working Group on EMPLOYEE RATING

[REDACTED]

(9 meetings have been held and the following summary is complete through 14 December 1951)

1. Performance Rating

- A. The Working Group agreed to devise a rating system that can be integrated into the Career Service Program. It was further agreed that the technical requirements for a rating system under Public Law 873 could undoubtedly be met without difficulty even though CIA would request exemption from that Law by reason of administrative restrictions that were not compatible with security.
- B. Further discussion on Performance Rating resulted in a recommendation to the Career Service Committee by the Working Group that there be no Performance Rating as such, but there will be recommended an employee evaluation system which will evaluate every employee. In the evaluation system current job performance would be included as a factor requiring rating by the supervisor in the process of evaluation.
- C. Review of the procedures of other Agencies led the Working Group to recommend to the Career Service Committee that Employee Rating be included in the evaluation system in the same wording as is used by AEC in complying with Public Law 873. The AEC statement is:

"John Doe meets (or exceeds) the requirements of his position." or "John Doe does not meet the requirements of his position."

2. Employee Evaluation

- A. Primary purpose is to insure to the Agency and the employee the best use of his aptitudes, knowledges, skills, and interests. Evaluation of these factors is the first step for planning a career development system.
- B. From definition of purpose the Working Group is now moving to selection of evaluation factors as they relate to aptitudes, knowledges, skills, and interests.

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EMPLOYEE RATING II-2

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3. General points of agreement of the Working Group.

- A. Job families may necessitate the establishment of more than one evaluation system but the purpose is to maintain simplicity and the Group will endeavor to recommend only one system for all employees.
- B. An employee evaluation system to be effective requires proper training of the supervisor making the evaluation and, to a limited extent, discussion between employee and supervisor. The latter is limited as certain factors in evaluation do not lend themselves to such discussion.
- C. Each member of the Working Group will use some device to determine the position of his Office on the conclusions or recommendations made by the Group.

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CAREER BENEFITS III-1

III Working Group on CAREER BENEFITS

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I. Hazardous duty benefits.

- A. Increase in base salary for service involving unusual hardship and hazard.
- B. Extension of the authority contained in Confidential Funds Regulations, authorizing pay, within grade advances, and grade promotions for individuals who are detained involuntarily to include those employees paid from vouchered funds. ILLEGIB
- C. Application of United States Employees Compensation Act to dependents of employees engaged in hazardous duties who are themselves exposed to hazard.
- D. Death gratuity of six months' base pay to dependents of CIA employees whose death occurs in line of duty while serving abroad.
- E. Consideration of retirement benefits.

II. Consideration of the adoption of new classification and salary schedules in lieu of the present policy which follows provisions of the Classification Act of 1949 and allowances for overseas service.

III. The equitable application of leave to all classes of employees.



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CAREER BENEFITS III-2

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2. By Memorandum to Career Service Committee, dated 19 November 1951, re "Parachute Pay for Staff Employees and Staff Agents," the Working Group recommended that parachute pay for appropriate trainees is necessary and desirable and presented six broad principles for consideration, with the recognition that such principles would require approval of the DCI and that detailed regulations necessarily must be devised upon such approval. The principal document of reference considered by the Working Group pertaining to this subject is the Memorandum from the Assistant Director of Training (Covert) to the Joint Training Committee, dated 18 September 1951.

Note: The problem was referred by the Career Service Committee to the Senior Review Committee for approval of regulations to be drafted by the Advisor for Management. The Senior Review Committee was convened on 30 November 1951 and after full discussion referred the problem back to the Career Service Committee for inclusion of other types of hazardous duty pay encountered in training situations. This being an operating problem of the Office of Training, the Committee asked that Office to handle directly with the DD/A (Special) henceforth. 25X1A

3. By Memorandum to Chairman, Career Service Committee, dated 29 November 1951, re "Continuance of Pay and Allowances", the Working Group suggested that, through an appropriate method, the benefits of the Missing Persons Act, or similar provisions, be made available to all employees of CIA. Along this same line is to be considered a bill pending before Congress, S. 1820, which is to accomplish the same purposes of the Missing Persons Act, which will expire as a wartime statute upon ratification by the Senate of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Recommendation was made that CIA support S. 1820. Since it is obvious that the progress of the Bill will have to be followed carefully in order to insure that probable revisions will maintain it consistent with CIA objectives, it was further suggested that such responsibility for action be placed on the General Counsel's Office (for following the Bill and informing the appropriate Congressional Committees of CIA support for the provisions of the Bill).

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~~SECRET~~ CAREER BENEFITS III-3

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4. In connection with the overall task of the Working Group ("Consideration of the adoption of new classification and salary schedules in lieu of the present policy which follows provisions of the Classification Act of 1949...."), [REDACTED] presented his views on the need for some kind of "Commissioned Service", perhaps along the lines of the State Department's Foreign Service, within the CIA. Following are some objectives which would be attained by such career structure.

- a) Discipline and control of personnel necessary for flexibility to meet rapidly changing situations.
- b) Stability of personnel.
- c) Esprit de Corps
- d) Career retirement plan.
- e) Wage and Pay schedule on a long range career basis.
- f) A Reserve to be called upon in case of need.
- g) Legislative confirmation of existence.
- h) Acceptance of the philosophy that in CIA, responsibility should be vested in the individual rather than the position.

After much discussion, it was agreed that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] will study the career structure plans of the Armed Forces, Foreign Service, Public Health and other "commissioned services" and, after such study, will prepare an outline to be brought before the Working Group for discussion in the near future.

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/s/ [REDACTED]

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IV Working Group on TRAINEES

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Note: This Working Group has been hampered by illness and unavailability of some of its original members and although four meetings have been held, it is not making a progress report at this time. -

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EXTENSION TRAINING V-1

V Working Group on EXTENSION TRAINING

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(6 meetings have been held and the following summary is complete through 14 December 1951)

1. The Directive to the Working Group on Extension Training has been broadened to include consideration of internal CIA training as well as extra-CIA training, as follows:

Problem:

To survey the types of extra-CIA training that are required and to recommend to the Career Service Committee policies and procedures for putting into effect an extension training program or programs a.) in universities, colleges and laboratories and other research and educational institutions in the United States and abroad, b.) in service schools and colleges of the Armed Forces, c.) in industry, d.) in other United States Government Agencies, e.) in other friendly foreign intelligence services and f.) in other friendly foreign government units and staff colleges; to inquire into and to recommend methods of selecting individuals, schedules and phasing; to investigate possible magnitude of such a program; to recommend security measures made necessary by reason of these extra-CIA activities; what training in general should be offered in CIA and what outside.

2. Comments on the References in the Directive to "A Program for the Establishment of a Career Corps in the Central Intelligence Agency", dated 7 August 1951.

- a. On: Flow-chart, Sections VI & VII: Selection of Career Corps and Training & Rotation of Specialists & Generalists
Paragraph VI, page xiii: Training of Career Corps Specialists
Paragraph VII, page xiii: Training of Career Corps Generalists

Agreed that: "The Working Group on Extension Training notes that the flow charts VI and VII inserted between pages vii and x of the Report and paragraphs VI and VII on page xiii are summaries of Section VI (pages

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14-16) and Section VII (pages 17-18), needing for their revision only editorial action to reflect whatever new form the Career Service Committee may give to these sections: therefore, this group has no comment thereon".

- b. On: Appendix D, page 31: Arrangements with Armed Forces for Training of Professional Trainees.

Agreed that: The Working Group on Extension Training believes that Appendix D does not concern this group.

- c. On: Appendix B, pages 20-21: List of Institutions in which Contacts should be Established.

Agreed that: The Working Group on Extension Training judges that Appendix B is of primary interest to the Working Group on Trainees, in view, however, of the statement in Appendix P, page 67, first paragraph, concerning arranging programs in the Universities, we desire to point out that changing conditions in extension training requirements and facilities are such that no definite list of extension training facilities should be made up.

- d. On: Appendix L, page 60: Advanced Training - CIA Intelligence School

Appendix R, page 72: Graduate Training - CIA Intelligence School

Agreed that: Decision postponed until completion of consideration on other points. There was disagreement among group members both as to whether this group should express its views on the compass of the CIA Intelligence School, and as to what methods, if any, should be taken to obtain clarification on this point.

- e. On: Appendix M, page 61: Language Training for Specialists

Agreed that: The Working Group on Extension Training believes that, because of the basic importance of language studies, the specialized needs of the Agency, and considerations for security and convenience, a considerable proportion of language instruction should be given within the Agency in the CIA Language Program.

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~~SECRET~~ EXTENSION TRAINING V-3

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- f. On: Section VI, pages 14-16: Training of Career Corps Specialists
Section VII, pages 17-18: Training of Career Corps Generalists
Appendix K, pages 56-59: Rotation Plan for Specialists
Appendix N, pages 62-64: Rotation Plan for Generalists

Agreed that: The Working Group on Extension Training believes that the distinction, mentioned in the reference between Specialist and Generalist is not applicable to the assigned tasks of this Group, and proposes not to return to the matter unless specifically so directed.

- g. On: Appendix P, pages 67-68: Implementation of University & Industrial Training

Agreed that: The Working Group on Extension Training concurs in general with the ideas of Appendix P, but notes certain aspects which require further study.

3. The following questions are being considered by the Group and are indicative of the future actions that will be taken by the Group:
- a. Can the Group suggest a generally applicable system of selection?
 - b. Can the Group decide on how much training should be arranged by interested offices without seeking TO assistance?
 - c. Can the Group decide how many additional trainee slots should be provided and under what circumstances?
 - d. Can the Group decide how many people should take training and when?
 - e. Can the Group make all of its recommendations applicable to the present stringent personnel situation as well as to any probable future situations?
 - f. Can the Group decide which training should be on-the-job and which should be formal courses?
 - g. Can the Group decide which training should be extra-CIA and which should be intra-CIA?

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ROTATION VI-1

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VI Working Group on ROTATION

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(9 meetings have been held and the following summary is complete through 14 December 1951)

1. The Working Group has tentatively agreed that an individual should serve two years with the Agency and be a GS-7 or above before he becomes a part of the rotation system.
2. The following definitions have been adopted:
 - A. Rotation: The process of systematic designation and redesignation of an individual to various kinds of duty and training for the purpose of improving his capacity to serve the Agency.
 - B. Training: The process of providing instruction and practice in intelligence and related activities, initially and throughout the career of the individual in order to develop necessary attitudes, skills and knowledge and to broaden his understanding of various phases of the activities of the Agency.

For purpose of this definition, training may take place within the Agency or at external facilities, either in the United States or overseas. Training may also include designated duty other than a regular duty assignment for the purpose of providing instruction and practice in activities of the Agency collateral to the regular duty assignment of the individual.

3. The Working Group adopted the following statement concerning the objectives of Rotation:
 - A. The broad objective of rotation is to improve the capacity of the individual to serve the Agency. Specifically, rotation aims at the following objectives:
 - (1) for the Agency:
 - (a) a more effective and more economical utilization of the Agency's manpower.

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ROTATION VI-2

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- (b) a method of improving the selection and broadening the experience of individuals to serve in key positions.
 - (c) the cultivation of an "esprit de corps" based primarily on the reward for merit principle.
- (2) for the individual:
- (a) assisting him to do his present job more effectively by:
 - 1. increasing his knowledge in depth in his field.
 - 2. providing him with new skills, techniques and methods of performance.
 - 3. improving his ability to plan his work and to direct and supervise others in it.
 - 4. increasing his understanding of the necessary relationships of his job to those of collateral and higher echelons of the Agency.
 - (b) preparing him to undertake jobs of increasingly greater responsibility commensurate with his growth potential by:
 - 1. broadening his understanding of the objectives of the Agency and its mission.
 - 2. intensifying the development of his planning, managerial and supervisory skills.
 - (c) providing him more opportunity to find the field in which he does best.
 - (d) removing an individual from a "rut".
- 4. It was agreed that while most jobs will fall in the category of Generalist or Specialist it would be inadvisable to attach these labels to the individual.
 - 5. The fact that any individual proves to be non-promotable but is highly qualified at his present level and position does not necessarily require selection out or further rotation.
 - 6. Individuals may be rotated from a job to other assignments and back to the same job but not necessarily so.

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/s/ [REDACTED]

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